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Abstract: Dieser Artikel ist die Übersetzung des zuerst in 1950 veröentlichten
Schlüsseltextes “Humanisme og kristendom” des dänischen Philosophen und
Theologen Knud E. Løgstrup (1905–1981). In diesem Text legt Løgstrup seine
Konzeption der Debatte zwischen Humanismus und Christentum dar. Er argu-
mentiert dafür, dass die beiden Positionen nicht als einander entgegengesetzt zu
betrachten sind, da beide die Interdependenz und Verletzlichkeit des Mensch-
seins als Grundlage für eine “stumme” Forderung nach Umsorge erkennen –
auch wenn der Humanismus in dieser Forderung lediglich die Leistung sozialer
Normen sehen und das Christentum sie mit Lehren der Kirche verwechseln kann.
So betrachtet, greift der Text als erster Entwurf jenen Ideen vor, die Løgstrup in
seinem späteren Hauptwerk Den etiske fordring (1956) entwickeln sollte.
Keywords: Knud E. Løgstrup, Humanism, Christian Ethics, ideology, Christian
politics, the ethical demand, human interdependence, Jesus’s proclamation
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[456] Humanism is – among many other things – having the sense of a cer-
tain conflict, the implication being that where the sense of the conflict is lost,
inhumanity arises. What conflict?
We never have something to do with another human being without holding
something of that person’s life in our hands. It can be very little, a passing mood,
a dampening or quickening of spirit, a disgust we deepen or take away. But it
can also be of tremendous significance, so that it is simply up to us whether
the other person’s life flourishes or not. We can only hope that it may often be
the case that it was very little that depended on us. But it is certainly fortunate
for the sake of our peace of mind that we have no idea what we have had of
other people’s courage in life or flourishing, sincerity or duplicity in our hands,
through what we were and said and did in our relationship with them, but that
this is hidden. Then, while exploiting the fact that this crucial matter is hidden,
we can indulge in the illusion that our contribution to the life we have with each
other is nothing more than what we accomplish in a tangible and demonstrable
sense. But it can happen that science suddenly reveals what otherwise is hidden
and places openly in the light of day the extent to which we are each other’s
fate. I am thinking of psychology’s and psychiatry’s demonstration of how a
child’s life is determined for their whole future by the adult’s behaviour towards
it, how parental [457] ambitions for their children, which in bourgeois life’s
ambiguity is considered commendable, humanly speaking is a curse because it
means an upbringing that for life may deprive the child of the most precious
thing of all, its courage in life. Now, in everyday life, the adult’s relationship
with the child is probably the place where in the most far-reaching sense one
has the other’s life in one’s hands, which explains why it is precisely here that
science has been able to observe it; but it applies equally well in all sorts of
degrees to the relationships with which we have to do with one another.
This means that in any encounter between people there is an unspoken
claim, regardless of the circumstances under which the meeting takes place
and the character it has. We do not give this much thought for several reasons.
Because we have a strange and unconscious notion that we do not belong within
the world in which a human being has their life. Concerning the world that
for the individual is their life’s content, we have a peculiar notion that the
individual themselves is this world, so we and everyone else are outside it and
only from time to time come into contact with it. If for that reason meetings
between people normally consist in nothing more than their worlds touching
each other, only for them to carry on fully intact and undisturbed, then it all
cannot be terribly important. It only becomes important where a human being,
as an exception and by accident, through a misdemeanor or good or ill will,
breaks into another human being’s world. However, in fact, this is a curious idea,
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whose peculiarity is not diminished by the fact that we take it for granted to
such a great extent. Indeed, really the circumstances are quite dierent: we are
one another’s world. Literature has always known this, philosophy and theology
by contrast remarkably seldom.
But on the other hand, what does occupy us is how everything we accom-
plish [458] belongs to the other’s world. That is another reason why we do not
have a sense of the unspoken claim that is given in every meeting between
people. We are used to thinking culturally, and we are close to only being able
to think culturally about what one individual in a positive or negative sense
is for the other. This is because meaning is something cultural, inasmuch as
it is disseminated by a public medium, a novel, a scientific inquiry, a political
work, or whatever it might be. Therefore, its influence is also detectable – to the
extent that sometimes in due course it may give rise to historical studies. In this
indirect way, namely through cultural activities – from the most simple digging
of a piece of land to the most complex performance – we know that we belong
to each other’s world. Yet, there are many things that tempt one to forget that a
meeting takes place here. This meeting is so often mediated through the cultural
medium, so indirect, that one person cannot tell who the other is. The author
does not know their readers, or the politician their voters. Just as the cultural
work has its own laws or rules, which demand training and perhaps talent, and
which therefore can completely and utterly absorb one’s interest. Nevertheless,
all cultural work exists for the sake of human life, not least as the individual
lives it in contact with others.
But despite everything that in one way or another diverts thought away from
it, it is still the case that we are each other’s world and each other’s fate. It is
through this fact that the claim is given, which therefore is unspoken and by no
means identical with the other person’s express wishes or requirements. This is
the reason for the conflict I have in mind, and which belongs to humanism.
[459] The demand which is contained in any relationship with another hu-
man being is not articulated in the expectations on me which the other person
says or indicates. If they coincide, this is purely accidental. Often, they do not,
but the relationship is indeed one solitary challenge to oppose the very thing
that the other human being expects and wishes me to do, because this alone
serves them best. The challenge, therefore, presupposes that I know better than
the other person what is best for them. If this were not the case, a communic-
ation between us – on a basic and existential level – of the kind where one
person has to do with another person would not be possible.
For if it were merely a matter of responding to the expectation of the other
and fulfilling their wish, our life together would simply consist in – irresponsibly
– making ourselves into the tool of the other person. There would no longer
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be any challenge in our mutual relationships, but these relationships would
just consist in pandering to one another. And indeed this is no mere theory.
In ordinary parlance, what is taken to count as ‘being nice’ consists in just
going along with the other person, abstaining from any contradiction which
would annoy them, refraining from any criticism that would insult, avoiding
the confrontation that would not be well received. To ‘be nice’ is to shy away
from contradiction in order to lead the conversation on to what we can agree
about, so that one can refrain from criticism and instead find a way to praise
them, to at all costs avoid confrontation in order to settle down cozily in mutual
agreement on something irrelevant. What people commonly call ‘love’ is usually
the kind of accommodation that results in an insincere relationship. What is
commonly called love is usually a mawkishness which shies away from the
truth between people like the plague. And the situation is not altered by the
fact that it could involve a [460] sacrifice that is both required and made. For,
without the will to truth, even sacrifice turns to flattery. In short, if there were
no dierence between the challenge implicit in every relationship and the other
person’s spoken request, our life together would consist in abandoning oneself
to the crowd; for a crowd can consist in just one human being, if my relation to
that person is just to go along with them, however much this may call on me to
make a great sacrifice and in chatter be construed as niceness.2
So, we have to recognize that the demand which is implicit in every meeting
between human beings never becomes vocal but is and remains silent, so that
I myself with whatever I may have left in terms of insight, imagination and
understanding must work out what it involves. While the demand is given with
the relationship as such and is therefore silent, it is me to whom it is addressed
and who must determine, from relationship to relationship and from situation to
situation, what its content is. Not in the sense that I can arbitrarily, whimsically,
and at my own discretion give it whatever content I like. In that case, there
would be no demand at all. But it is there, and since it is given with the very
fact that I belong to the world in which the other person has their existence,
and therefore I have something of the other human being’s life in my hands,
it is obviously a demand to take care of this life. But as regards how this is
2 In using the terminology of “the crowd” and “chatter,” Løgstrup is here referring to Kierkegaar-
dian and Heideggerian notions which he discusses at greater length in his lectures in Berlin that
were published the same year: K. E. Løgstrup, Kierkegaards und Heideggers Existenzanalyse und
ihr Verhältnis zur Verkündigung. Berlin: Eric Blaschker Verlag, 1950; Kierkegaards og Heideg-
gers Existensanalyse og dens Forhold til Forkyndelsen, ed. Svend Andersen. Aarhus: Klim, 2013;
Kierkegaard’s and Heidegger’s Analysis of Existence and Its Relation to Proclamation, translated
by Robert Stern et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
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to happen, nothing is said. Even though it concerns the other human being,
they themselves are not in a position to say anything about this; for, as was
mentioned before, it may well involve something completely opposed to their
expectations and wishes. I must become clear about it for myself.
But is this not intrusion and encroachment? For one might indeed ask:
how then does the individual come to know what best serves the other person,
especially when what supposedly [461] is best for them disappoints them or fills
them with resentment? To put it briefly, the individual comes to know this from
their own understanding of life. But of what concern is that to the other person,
who perhaps does not even share it? Why should they have an understanding
of life imputed to them or perhaps even forced on them, which is entirely alien
to them and which they can neither adopt nor appreciate?
In the nineteenth century, my topic would probably not have been called
humanism and Christianity, but idealism and Christianity. A prominent idea in
the idealistic ethics of the nineteenth century, largely through the influence of
Kant, was respect for the independence and autonomy of the other human being.
This ethics is severely criticized today by both philosophers and theologians;
and this critique is justified, as mutual respect for one another’s autonomy and
independence threatened to be all there is to ethics. The ethical came to consist
in self-formation, and respect for the other in their self-formation. Respect for the
other person’s independence was used to legitimate one’s own self-formation,
and in the end this inevitably led to a cult of personality.3 This view was based
on the idea that every human being is a world unto themselves, of which other
people were basically no part. Consequently, there was no consideration of the
conflict within which the idea of respect for the other human being’s independ-
ence and autonomy arises and belongs. This conflict arises as the question: of
what concern is my understanding of life to the other person, when because of
it, I fancy that I know better than the other person what is best for them.
3 Løgstrup does not give a reference here, but the critique of perfectionistic anthropology and
personalism (understood as the idea that ethical development of one’s person is of supreme
value) was an important topic both in Løgstrup and in contemporary theological existentialism. We
see evidence of this also in Rudolf Bultmann’s identically named article “Humanismus und Christ-
entum,” which Løgstrup undoubtedly knew, where Bultmann connects humanism with the forma-
tion of personhood and culture according to the ideas of the spirit: cf. “[. . .] soll diemenschliche Ge-
meinschaft in der Kultur nach den Ideen des Geistes geformt werden und der Einzelmensch zur Per-
sönlichkeit”. Rudolf Bultmann, “Humanismus und Christentum,” originally published in Studium
Generale, 1 (1948): 70–77, reprinted in Idem, Glauben und Verstehen. Gesammelte Aufsätze, Band
2. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 133–148, here 133 f.; translated into English by James C.
G. Greig as “Humanism and Christianity.” In Rudolf Bultmann, Essays Philosophical and Theolo-
gical. London: SCM Press, 1955, 151–167, here 152: “the human community is to be formed in civil-
ization according to the ideas of the mind, and the individual is to be formed into a personality.”
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 03.12.19 15:59
“Humanism and Christianity” 137
Now an understanding of life can be many things. It is a highly abstract
expression. It can be about something very basic, [462] for example that to live
a human life requires the will to be sincere. To disappoint a person’s desire for
flattery and pandering could therefore hardly be viewed as an attempt to impose
on them a foreign understanding of life – except perhaps by the disappointed
person themselves. There is a certain conception of what human existence is,
which one has to assume is unavoidable.
However, an understanding of life can take on more and more definite
features, and a firm structure, so that in this way it becomes more and more
narrow. It can become hardened into an ideology, so that for the individual
it becomes something simply absolute. The more this happens, the more the
individual will view their relationship to other human beings as an occasion for
intrusion and possibly encroachment. The view of life that has stiened into
an ideology becomes, for the individual, what gives their life meaning, now in
the sense of inverting their order of rank: their life exists for the sake of their
view of life, rather than the other way around. It is not so much a case of their
own life giving content to the view of life, because it in its humanity has its
meaning in itself, as the reverse: it is the view of life that gives content to life –
a life that without that view is empty. The life view becomes the thing for which
they simply exist. Consequently, they take it that what is valid for their own
existence must also as a result be valid for everyone else’s as well. The ultimate
truth which they have got hold of, must also be the ultimate truth for the other
person – otherwise it would not be ultimate. In the name of this ultimate truth,
they therefore know – with undeniable certainty – what best serves the other.
Consequently, they do not need to let themselves be disturbed by the idea of
respect for the independence or autonomy of other human beings. Moreover,
the further this process goes on, the easier it becomes to encroach on the other
person with good conscience: [463] after all, it is the ultimate truth, it is the
absolute view of life, to which one is responsible.
Just as it is possible to lose all appreciation of the conflict under discussion
here, through an attitude of pandering, in the policy of mutual admiration, or in
the indierence towards each other, which is hidden under the guise of respect
for the other’s life in their own world; so it can also be lost in a similar way
when the view of life becomes so rigid and so religiously final that we think we
know what serves the other best in the sense that it is only through our view of
life that not only our own life is given meaning and content, but also the life of
the other human being.
By contrast, humanism is to remain standing where (for now to use a tradi-
tional vocabulary), philistinism’s and ideology’s roads intersect without setting
out on either the one road or the other.
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 03.12.19 15:59
138 Knud E. Løgstrup
Humanism is retaining a lively awareness that we always stand in the con-
flict between a consideration which amounts to indulgence, acquiescence, and
flattery on the one hand, and an inconsiderateness that for the sake of our own
understanding of life becomes intrusion and encroachment on the other. The
conflict has no solution at the level of principle. But there is always a possible
solution through making a judgement as best we can in the circumstances, even
if we don’t actually achieve it in the given situation and even if we usually get it
wrong. However, finding a solution through judgement is only possible with the
help of a sense for the conflict. Amongst many other things, this sense belongs
to humanism.
*
Now what is Christianity’s relation to this humanism? In the first place it depends
on what is meant by Christianity. Church history shows us that as a cultural
phenomenon, [464] as an institution and a way of thinking, as a politics and
morality, Christianity, because it turned into an ideology, was in general an
enemy of humanism. The Christian understanding of life becomes systematized
theoretically and practically in such a way that it becomes a solidified system
and a corresponding strategy and tactics emerges out of it. The understanding is
detached from the life of which it is an understanding, becoming independent
and impersonal and nearly acquiring the reality of a thing.
Everything is then in place so that it can override life, so our human life
becomes something that exists for the sake of the life view. It is this inversion
which, not completely but suciently perhaps for the present context, is my
definition of an ideology.
Now, it is not only in the course of history that Christianity has been a
cultural phenomenon, but it is just as much so today. It is therefore usually also
ideological. Without going into details, the ideological inversion is there in the
ordinary ecclesiastical notion that being a Christian is to serve the Gospel. The
other person thus becomes the object of a cause that should be promoted. This
manifests itself in manifold ways. Christians become interested in the church’s
power, prestige and influence. There exists an association in our country that
has just this as its only purpose.4 The Christian sees the church as a battle front
within the people. There is a magazine in our country which is even called this.5
4 This is a reference to Kirkens Front – see next note.
5 This appears to be a reference to Kirkens Front (The Church’s Front). This began as an illegal
publication in 1943 founded by a theology student Johannes Dragsdahl under inspiration from
Arne Sørensen, the charismatic leader of Dansk Samling, a conservative illegal organization for
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The confession and service that the individual Christian owes his neighbour
is organized and collectivized at times with the stated grounds that only in
this way can it be suciently eective. But now anyone can see and hear that
the church’s ways of working are ideologically determined. Of course, we are
the same people whether we are in the one place or the other. [465] To every
delusion of bourgeois and popular life there corresponds a delusion within the
church. Drawing a parallel can often be enlightening.
But, when the idea of the church, its position in the people, and its ways
of working, is so ideologically ingrained, then in addition to the already given
general reason, there is probably also a special reason as well which I just want
to mention, without however going into detail: namely that the church refuses
to accept the consequence of the secularisation that is given with the message
which is its raison d’être. As far as I can see, the philosophers and theologians
are right who assert that the Judeo-Christian belief in creation, because it makes
nature a profane organism, helps to hand it over to investigation by modern
natural science, as argued by Erich Frank, Rudolf Bultmann, and Friedrich
Gogarten. With the Judeo-Christian belief in creation, for modern man the world
once and for all ceased to be animated or divine. In a similar way, Christianity’s
establishment of the incommensurability between time and eternity, which is
a break with all Greek thinking, is a prerequisite for our concepts of time and
of history, as a result of which our life is determined by the future, not least in
our secular thinking. And, finally, Jesus’s proclamation is in the same way the
precondition for understanding that the civic and political arrangements of our
lives together are not a religious but a secular matter. His proclamation never
concerns the relationship to another human being understood as a relationship
determined by kinship or national aliation, or as regulated and guaranteed
morally, legally and economically. Jesus polemicizes constantly against using
religion, the relationship to God, as an additional regulation and control of these
relations alongside the familial, national, [466] moral, legal and economic ones.
Precisely in this lies the radicality of his message.
Nevertheless, the massive majority of the Protestant church and its theolo-
gians protest against the secularization process, which is among other things
and perhaps mainly based on an infatuation with Christianity as an ideology.
For it is obvious that an ideology must of course be used to regulate and safe-
guard civil and political life. What else should it be used to do? If the ideology
resistance against the Germans. The publication of the periodical continued after the war but
stopped in 1958. Løgstrup is therefore criticizing some of his former allies in the resistance here.
Curiously, there seems to be no connection between the periodical and the association. (Thanks
to Ole Jensen and Hans Fink for the information in this note.)
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is religious, it is regulation and safeguarding squared, so to speak: a regulation
and safeguarding again of the familial, national, moral and legal regulation and
safeguards, which are thus not sucient. Admittedly this step is never fully
taken by the Protestant church; Luther and in this country Grundtvig are an
obstacle to that. By contrast it is taken by the Roman Catholic Church; for it
has a full-fledged Christian philosophy with which it can combat any tendency
to secularization. In my estimation, it is above all else the stance towards secu-
larization which is the dierence between Catholicism and Protestantism that
matters nowadays.
In order to avoid a misunderstanding which is very common, secular think-
ing has nothing to do with the thesis of social life’s so-called ‘laws of their own’
[Eigengesetzlichkeit].6 Thinking in a secular way does not mean that human
beings abdicate in favour of things.
*
But how does the proclamation that underlies Christianity as a cultural phe-
nomenon relate to humanism? One thing humanism shares not only with Jesus’s
proclamation but also with the Old Testament prophecy, is that our life’s mystery
is not the gender dierence [467] and fertility that connects us with nature and
is nature in us, but it is the unspoken demand, that lies in the life that we have
together. Our life’s mysteriousness is not, as in nature religions, its natural basis,
the sexual act and procreation, but our life’s mystery is its humanity, everything
which, despite the fact that we belong to nature, at the same time separates
us from it. This is simply the most elementary presupposition of humanism as
well as Christianity, including Judaism. However, what is not so obvious is the
answer to the question of what then the specifically human consists in. Is it all
the culture-creating abilities that we use to organize ourselves in a world that
is full of the tools that we have formed, and the works that we have made, in
which we feel at home and to which we have given the mark of our own life
and which therefore gives us security? One can indeed call this humanism, as
humanism can be so many things. But if this is the right answer, then it is not
6 As far as Løgstrup is concerned, this concept comes from German Lutheran ordinance-theology
in the 1930s, while the term itself can be traced back to Max Weber. It involves the claim that
dierent areas of social life (e. g. politics and economy) have their own, inherent laws. In an early
lecture held in 1934 Løgstrup had subscribed to this idea, but now he dissociates himself from it.
For further discussion, see Kees van Kooten Niekerk, “Vejen til Den etiske fordring.” In Livtag med
Den etiske fordring, ed. David Bugge, Peter Aaboe Sørensen. Aarhus: Klim, 2007, 9–46, which is
available in English here: https://ethicaldemand.wordpress.com/resources-and-link/.
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in the really human, but only in the natural basis, that the ungraspable is found.
If on the other hand, the responsibility and the guilt that are given with the fact
that we in trust and distrust are each other’s world, is that which divides us
from nature, then our life’s ungraspability and mystery lies in the really human.
That is how I understand humanism.
But why should that be called ungraspable, let alone something mysterious?
When the other person through the trust with which they meet me, places a part
of their life or maybe their whole life into my hands, then it is quite obvious
that I owe it to them to take care of it. This indeed can be grasped. Yes, as long
as it is a trust that I appreciate and as long as it enhances my courage in life.
But what if the other is a person with whom I have no concern and their trust
is most disturbing, since it [468] breaks into my existence in a most disruptive
way? Or what if the other meets me with distrust? For indeed the fact of the
matter is that it is not just in trust of the other that we are each other’s world,
but we are this no less in hostility. How many thoughts and feelings and actions
does not enmity engage! To how large an extent does not a person often have
their enemy’s whole life in their hand in the way that they meet the person! How
dependent is the person on the one that they hate – sometimes more dependent
than on the one they love!
If, therefore, I become responsible for what another human being places of
their own existence in my hands, whoever it is, whether it is one of my nearest
and dearest or if it is a stranger with whom I have no business, and no matter
what way they do it, whether it is in trust or hostility, then the demand is both
ungraspable and mysterious. For there is no moderation in it. Why on earth
should I disregard any consideration for myself, even if it be a very moderate
one, in favour of a consideration for a human being who is absolutely none
of my business, and who does not belong at all to the world, which now in a
narrower sense I have made my own? Why should any assessment of the other
in terms of culture, character and morality be disregarded?
Therefore, the problem also arises of the justification of morality, which
throughout the history of philosophy has been solved in the most ingenious
ways. Now, this can be either a redundant or a very useful problem. Taken in
the usual way, where it has to do with what ethical life hinges upon, namely, its
origins and the ethical motives’ source, the problem is one of the most redundant
there is. [469] For ethical life is given by the fact that we cannot live a human
life at all without our relationships having the character of responsibility. The
fact of responsibility – which is that everything that gives the responsible person
an occasion to say and do anything, they shall say and do not for themselves,
but for the sake of the other human being, for whom they are responsible –
renders redundant any justification that looks around for the origins of morality.
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The justification of morality becomes nothing but an embellishment for the fact
that we are one another’s world. The other human being is, if you will, already
the justification before any justification.
However, if we look for the motive of the search for moral justification –
and the consequence of such a justification – then this is one of the most useful
things there is. For this does in fact always mean that the demand is moderated
because one way or another it somehow brings the moment of reciprocity into
the ethical relationship between human beings. The person who is under the
demand, also has rightful entitlements of their own. Moral justification obscures
the demand’s ungraspable and mysterious lack of reciprocity and is thus a way
to regulate and secure life in line with other regulations and safeguards, such
as for example the administration of justice and politics. This is its usefulness!
Then you can again ask: is this humanism? For humanism can be both the
one and the other. Is humanism the regulation and safeguarding of a human
life in the name of mutual interest and quid pro quo? Not in the way I have
taken humanism, but rather I have taken it as renouncing the justification in
order to let the fact of the demand remain standing in its unreasonable lack of
reciprocity. And so too does Christianity.
But it does so by proclaiming that the demand is God’s. [470] Thus the idea
is that it is demanded of the individual that they should take care of the other
human being’s life, because it is to a greater or lesser degree delivered up to
them by either the trust or distrust the other shows them. But since it is not said
that this caring is carried out by complying with the other’s express wishes, as
on the contrary it can at times only be achieved by going against them, so the
requirement is unspoken. This is what the human perspective can say about it.
Christianity proclaims by contrast that the demand is silent because it is God’s.
Self-assertion and the drive for self-preservation resist the requirement in the
name of reciprocity, saying: it must stop somewhere! It must be more moderate!
After all, I must also have my own rightful entitlements. Otherwise the whole
thing becomes ungraspable! It is also absolutely certain that we set boundaries,
and very narrow ones, to what, as we say, can be ‘reasonably’ expected of us.
But these are limits that do not have their origin in the demand; they are not
laid down by the demand itself, but we set them on it precisely so that we do
not have to hear it and recognize ourselves as guilty in relation to it. That is
what the human perspective can say. Christianity proclaims by contrast that the
demand is immoderate because it is divine.
However, this is still not yet what is characteristic for Christianity. Rather
the content of Jesus’s proclamation and the content of the proclamation about
Jesus is that God never demands what he does not himself give. This is the
real reason why the demand itself does not lay down any limits on itself. The
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demand’s lack of reciprocity depends – in Christianity – on the fact that life
has been bestowed on the individual. Every word and every deed that can be
used to help the other human being, is bestowed on the individual, because
life itself with its [471] possibilities for communication in words and deeds has
been bestowed. Any possibility of compassion towards and forgiveness of the
other has been bestowed on the individual, just as the individual person has
been shown compassion and granted forgiveness in a divine sense.7 When we
therefore set limits to the demand so that what can be required of us must be
moderate, it is – Christianly speaking – because we deny that life with all its
possibilities is a gift. That which we do not owe to God we do not owe to our
neighbour.
That the demand does not lay down limits to itself does not mean that what
is required is something extraordinary in a heroic sense. As is apparent from
Jesus’s proclamation, it may just as well be very ordinary words and actions in
a very ordinary life. Nevertheless the demand is immoderate, even if in a given
situation it is an extremely minimal thing that is to be done. For the individual
who is put under the unspoken demand has to decide for themselves what
serves the other best, and that is to say that they have to decide this selflessly.
No matter how big or how small what is to be done may be, it is the case that
the demand is immoderate, because it can only be obeyed selflessly.
*
7 We have chosen to translate the Danish word “barmhjertighed” as “compassion” rather than
“mercy”. Løgstrup’s use of the word “barmhjertig” is closely connected to the biblical story of the
good Samaritan, in Danish den barmhjertige samaritan (Luke 10:10–37). “Barmhjertighed” is the
Danish translation of Greek eleos and Hebrew hesed, which Luther translated as “Barmherzigkeit”,
and which is traditionally translated as “mercy”. However, the problem with “mercy” as a term in
English is that it is primarily applied to cases which involve sparing someone from punishment;
but this does not correspond to Løgstrup’s understanding of the Samaritan story, which instead
involves the desire to relieve the suering of other people and acting accordingly. For this reason,
“compassion” seems to be a more suitable translation than “mercy”, although previously in the
Løgstrup literature and translations “mercy” has been used as the preferred translation, e. g. when
translating the sovereign expression of life “barmhjertighed”. Nonetheless, this could raise the
following worry: compassion is too passive and thus unlike mercy is more of a merely emotional
state than mercy; but it is of crucial importance both to the Samaritan story and to Løgstrup’s use
of “barmhjertighed” that action is also involved: “Go, and do likewise”, as Jesus replies (Luke
10:37). Here Løgstrup draws a distinction between “medlidenhed”, which ismerely passive (and so
more like “sympathy” or “fellow-feeling”), and “barmhjertighed”, which involves action. However,
it is not clear this diculty really arises, as in English “compassion” also usually involves acting,
as a person who merely felt compassion but did not act would not count as being compassionate.
Therefore, Løgstrup’s important distinction is captured by the use of “compassion” rather than
“pity” or “sympathy”.
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When asked about the relationship between humanism and Christianity, one
of the questions is – and probably the crucial one – whether the dierence is
only religious or also ethical. If the human is all culture-creating abilities that
are used to create a world in which we feel at home, or if the human is the will
to regulate and safeguard our lives together under the mark of mutual interest,
then the dierence between humanism and Christianity is not only religious,
but ethical. By contrast, if the human is the demand that is given with the fact
that [472] the individual is part of the world in which the other has their life and
therefore holds part of the life of the other, or perhaps the other’s whole life,
in their hands, so that they can only place limits on the demand by incurring
guilt, then the dierence between humanism and Christianity is only religious.
But if there is no ethical dierence between humanism and Christianity in
terms of the demand, is there not then a dierence in terms of the conflict I
was talking about at the beginning? After all, Christianity makes the demand
understandable. Mind you, not for those for whom the human is culture-creating,
because for them what is understandable is only what helps to make the world
a home, which we have designed ourselves and is marked by us. Of course it is
also not understandable for those to whom the human is reciprocity. Christianity
only makes the demand understandable religiously – in two ways: it is God’s
and therefore speaks in the silence and not in everything that the other chatters
on about. The demand does not itself lay down any limits, because God does not
demand anything other than what he himself bestows. But then the question
is whether or not the person who accepts the Christian understanding of the
demand, with this understanding masters the conflict that the demand puts the
individual in. Is there then not this ethical dierence between humanism and
Christianity?
To this the answer is no. The person who receives the Christian understand-
ing is, as far as the conflict is concerned, in exactly the same position as the
one who from the human point of view renounces any religious understanding.
This understanding is of no use in removing the conflict from the world, being
able to do without judgement, and instead providing certainty in the situation
regarding what it is right to say and do.
For if it were good for that, the Christian understanding [473] of the demand
would abolish its silence. But is this not what – Christianly understood – has
happened in Jesus’s proclamation?
No, precisely not. What is peculiar here is that everything that Jesus has
said – and which has been handed down to us – every story and parable, every
answer in a conversation or an argument, every concisely formulated utterance,
is a proclamation of that particular demand which in itself is silent. That is
indeed why there is nothing handy about his proclamation. Therefore, every
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attempt made to systematize it has failed. It contains no instructions, no precepts,
no morals, no casuistry – nothing that takes responsibility away from human
beings by a priori solving in advance the conflicts into which the demand places
a human being. All his words speak of the one demand, but with not one word
does he break its silence.
This has been the prerogative of Christianity as a church and theology,
as politics and morality. However, when one uses the understanding that the
demand is God’s to break its silence, then one pretends to know something
else and more concerning the demand than what in an unspoken way lies in
the fact that the other’s life in trust or distrust, to a greater or lesser extent, is
delivered up to me. Then the Christian pretends to have a divinely guaranteed
knowledge about what in the given situation should be said and done and
how the relationships between us shall be ordered. Then God has become an
argument, morally and politically. The silence is broken, often in a very noisy
way, in obstinacy and in an unendurable and loquacious sense of knowing better
than anyone else.
Does understanding then oer no help in resolving the conflict that the
demand puts us in, which was that if the service should not consist in indulgence
and perhaps pandering, one risks that it will come to consist in encroachment,
just as the only guarantee for not rendering oneself guilty of [474] encroachment
is to let the service consist in indulgence? The answer is that understanding
only provides the help that is implicit in its own content. Understanding that
everything that is required of the individual is bestowed on them prevents one
– provided one sticks to this understanding – while considering what should
be said and done, from turning one’s thought away from the other who is to
be served, toward the triumph of one’s own words and deeds, as surely as
triumph is incompatible with gratitude. By contrast, the help never consists in
leaping over the conflict with some sort of divinely guaranteed prescription for
what needs to be said or done – in leaping over one’s own responsibility, one’s
own deliberations and eorts, with all their possibilities of failure, because our
insight is short-sighted, our humanity corrupted, and our love selfish.
If Christianity’s understanding of the demand were suitable for bringing the
conflict out of the world and in this regard placing the Christian on a dierent
footing from the humanist, then what God gave human beings would not be our
life with all its possibilities, but it would just be a matter of fixed opinions, a
life view, a theology, if you will. Then the demand would be a highly limited, a
finite demand that without being responsible, without requiring any work from
one’s own humanity and insight, we should realize and apply those opinions or
life view or theology. Then the demand could be heard elsewhere than in guilt.
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Then Christianity would be a safeguarding squared through religiosity of that
life that we are already looking to safeguard culturally, morally and legally.
Everyone is inclined to regard Christianity in this way. There are just as many
church-Christian ideologies that betray Christianity, as there are humanistic
ideologies that betray humanism. Of course.
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